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In this paper, I will address some o f the issues related to constitutional change and 
their impacts on Atlantic Canada. Like many economists and other social scientists 
across Canada, I participated in a number of studies on the economic impact of 
Quebec separation during the post-Meech Lake period in the years leading up to the 
referendum on the Charlottetown Accord. Virtually every policy institute, financial 
institution or indeed public or private interest with a stake in the economic future of 
the country was at that point investigating various aspects of separation.
During this period, the research on the economic impact o f constitutional change 
covered a wide range of topics. Every area of public policy, domestic and 
international, was tom apart and reexamined in terms o f the country's future with and 
without Quebec. The topics addressed included the environment, federal-provincial 
relations, key industrial sectors and trade policy. For Atlantic Canada, the research 
coalesced in three areas:
(1) industries with shared jurisdictions, such as the fisheiy, where the establishment 
o f international agreements could lead to a displacement of economic activity, as 
might occur with the loss of access to a traditional fishing area.
(2) federal-provincial fiscal relations, and in particular fiscal transfers between the 
federal and provincial government, transfers to business (regional development 
incentives) and transfers to persons, such as UI payments. These topics were given 
an almost uniformly gloomy treatment with respect to Atlantic Canada. It was 
generally assumed that any form of constitutional change would restrict the federal 
pipeline to Atlantic Canada. The Allaire Report,1 for example, called for a more 
open domestic economy with less restrictive interprovincial trade and a reduction in 
“dependence inducing” transfer payments. Whatever the form of constitutional
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change, whether Quebec's departure or a greater accommodation of provincial rights, 
most analysts interpreted it as inevitably leading to a reduction in the net inflow of 
transfer dollars. In transfer-dependant Atlantic Canada, it was assumed that this 
would automatically result in lower levels o f consumption and a deterioration of 
government services, placing the region's economy at a great disadvantage vis a vis 
the rest o f the North America.
(3) transportation links to the rest o f Canada. Transportation issues have been a 
dominant regional concern since the initial negotiations for Confederation prior to 
Confederation, and an ongoing source of federal-provincial conflict since then. The 
potential fragmentation of the country into two distinct parcels fueled a resurgence 
of concerns about how transportation links could be maintained or reworked. For 
example, for surface freight links, could a corridor authority or common trucking or 
rail regulations be established to allow shipments to move between the Atlantic 
provinces and the rest o f Canada, free of user or transit fees imposed by Quebec? 
Would the federal assets governing the St. Lawrence Seaway, and the myriad of 
Crown corporations involved with its operations, such as the Ports Corporation and 
the Seaway Authority, be sold? Would an independent Quebec take over ice 
breaking, the subsidy of which is a long-standing irritant to Atlantic Canadians? 
Again, most o f the analysis pointed to a mostly negative outcome for Atlantic 
Canada. With the loss o f Quebec, the four small eastern provinces would be further 
isolated and separated from major markets, with diminished federal support for 
essential transportation infrastructure.
This analysis and the discussion on the economic impact which I have referred 
to all took place in the pre-Charlottetown Accord era. After October 1992, the 
discussion on the economic consequences came to a fairly abrupt halt. Although 
there have been some attempts to raise the profile of this topic again (notably during 
the referendum), for the most part this has been resisted by policy makers. This is, 
for example, only the second time in five years where I have been asked to address 
this topic, and neither of these have been for a business or economic policy audience.
It seems to have been replaced by a much more muted discussion on other 
constitutional issues such as whether 50 percent plus one constitutes a majority or 
whether partition is democratic or antidemocratic. I use the word “muted” quite 
advisedly. It seems that most ordinary Canadians are less likely to feel comfortable 
in advancing an opinion in some o f these areas. In contrast almost everyone had an 
opinion on Quebec's departure, i.e., they felt it would lead to the loss o f their job or 
a reduction in their standard of living.
I suspect there are numerous reasons why the economic impact issues dropped 
to the back burner, with the overexposure of the topic in the media and elsewhere 
being, no doubt, an important consideration. Although most social scientists 
attempted to maintain an objective position in carrying out the studies to which I 
have referred, it was hard to avoid completely the emotions of the period. Certainly 
the information on the economic costs o f separation was used as a battering ram by 
those from the federalist camp, hoping that rational economic “hit them in the 
pocketbook” arguments could persuade where other arguments had failed. When this 
strategy was unsuccessful, there was an inevitable tendency to blame the messenger 
(or at least the analyst). Rational economic research frequently fails to convince the 
committed, instead merely inflaming them. Economists frequently get caught in the 
middle o f heated political debates.
On the surface, one might be led to believe that many of the concerns with the 
economic impact o f constitutional change died or at least lost their voices following 
the failure o f the Charlottetown Accord. On the contrary, the debate over Canada's 
constitutional future has been a major catalyst in encouraging a restructuring o f the 
economic union and specifically of federal-provincial relations. Many of the leading 
policy analysts redirected their energies away from the more obvious questions 
regarding Quebec's departure. This has been described as the effort among “political 
scientists, economists, lawyers and practitioners to extricate themselves from more 
than a decade o f Canadian constitutionalism and re-engage themselves in the 
remaking of Canadian federalism.”
The pressures which arose with the concern about our constitutional future have 
also coincided with a number o f economic factors. The last seven years since the 
recession of the early 1990s has been a period of exceptional change and 
restructuring for most industrialized countries and Canada is no exception. This has 
been led by rapid changes in technology, in particular, information technology and 
a shift from domestic to international markets. Canada's fiscal deficit and debt has 
also led to a significant downsizing and decentralization in areas of both economic 
and social policy.
The combined effect o f these factors has been to encourage a move away from 
policies which would support a highly centralized federal state in favour o f a more 
laissez-faire attitude generally and greater provincial autonomy in economic policy 
matters. The most pivotal source of ideas on the new federalism has been Tom 
Courchene, economist and director of the John Deutsch Institute at Queen's
University. In his Access Proposals (fall, 1996),2 Courchene points to the 
decentralist movement already underway and asks how do we reconstitute our 
internal socio-economic union? In his full Access model, the full responsibility for 
setting national (what Courchene calls pan-Canadian) principles in 
health/welfare/post-secondary education would fall to the provinces, with the current 
cash-transfer floor converted to tax transfers. Equalization would remain a key 
transfer, to allow the provinces access to the revenues sufficient to mount “national” 
programs.
The primary benefit o f this arrangement would be to allow one level of 
government to integrate all policies with respect to all aspects of the labour market, 
including education, welfare, training and employment insurance. This would avoid 
the rigidities which currently limit the efficient delivery of programs where both 
senior levels o f government are involved, or the federal unilateralism which 
frequently emerges in areas of dispute. ’
The proposals represent a radical restructuring of the traditional post-war status 
quo. They have triggered a far reaching debate on federalism, capturing almost as 
much energy, one might argue, as the pre-1992 debate on the economic impact o f 
constitutional change. To those who are uncomfortable with the premise of greater 
decentralization, Courchene argues that this is already underway, driven by global 
and to some extent fiscal forces. These proposals, in his view, reflect the changing 
environment and force the provinces to take on a greater responsibility 
commensurate with their increased power. Although not stated explicitly by 
Courchene, it seems that Quebec's aspirations for greater independence are never far 
removed from consideration. These proposals would be one way to allow Quebec 
and all provinces to have greater autonomy in areas such as labour market training 
and immigration.
What implications do these proposals have for the Atlantic provinces? To date, 
no part o f Canada has been more affected by the economic restructuring than the 
Atlantic region. The region's resource industries are no longer the mainstay of 
communities across this region and we are experiencing a rapid movement o f the
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population out o f rural areas. Fiscal restructuring has resulted in a rapid contraction 
o f government's role in the economy across the spectrum. For those who decry this 
loss o f federal support to the region, the Access proposals represent a further attack 
on the poorer provinces, forcing us to rely more on our limited internal resources and 
reducing further the federal lifeline.
I am not nearly as negative about the Access proposals as some of its critics from 
Atlantic Canada. In part this reflects my observations about the positive aspects o f  
the adjustment process underway in this region's economy. Despite the loss of 
employment in some industries and a contraction in government spending, the 
economy has shown a remarkable resilience, with new areas o f economic activity 
evident across all provinces. Quite apart from the more receptive environment which 
might encourage provinces such as Quebec to remain as part o f the economic union, 
the Access proposals could strengthen this adjustment process, leading the four 
Atlantic provinces to work more closely together on key economic strategies and 
taking a greater responsibility for their economic destiny.
Revitalizing the federal economic levers or moving further in favour of 
provincial rights? It is still not clear which outcome will have the greatest benefits 
for Atlantic Canada. However, more Atlantic Canadians need to become involved 
in this debate on the new federalism.
